INTRODUCTION
International law states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression.' These rights help underpin democracy and public participation. 2 New technologies, such as the Internet, provide an unprecedented opportunity to promote freedom of speech globally. Regrettably, some democratic governments are busy enacting regulations that inhibit the Internet's power. 3 This paper discusses freedom of speech 4 on the Internet within two of the world's largest democracies, the United States and India. 5 In the United States and India, similar constitutional provisions have yielded completely different standards for the protection of speech in 4. "Speech," as used in this article, includes words, pictures, sculptures, non-verbal symbols, etc. This article focuses on freedom of speech as applied to obscene speech.
5. H.R. 572, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. This Resolution, titled Indian Prime Minister's Visit to the United States, states:
Whereas the United States and the Republic of India are two of the world's largest democracies that together represent one-fifth of the world's population and more than one-fourth of the world's economy; Whereas the United States and Indian share common ideals and a vision for the 21 st century, where freedom and democracy are the strongest foundations for peace and prosperity; conventional media. 6 Recent legislation by the United States and India reflect the emergence of new standards for the regulation of Internet speech. These new standards aim at preserving distinctions that have evolved in conventional media. Because of the very nature of the Internet, however, these distinctions cannot be sustained with the Internet. The Internet could, nevertheless, act as an equalizer of freedom of speech.
Part I of this article gives a brief background on the development of the Interne and the constitutional issues arising from its use. With the everincreasing number of Internet users, 8 complex jurisdictional questions for constitutional actions must be addressed.
Despite similarities in their constitutional provisions, the United States and India have their own unique jurisprudence on freedom of speech. Consequently, they differ as to what is and what is not acceptable free speech. This article comparatively analyzes obscenity laws in the United States and India. Part II summarizes the respective obscenity standards in the United States and India while debating whether these tests can be applied to the Internet.
Political 9 and economic 0 considerations forced the regulation of the Internet in diverse areas. While regulators in the United States mainly deal with obscenity," regulators in India initially focused their attention on 6 . Conventional media includes press, radio, television, etc, i.e., means of communication excluding the Internet.
7. The discussion on the Internet's development excludes commentary on who invented it.
8. As of September 2000, estimated users worldwide jumped to 377.65 million, up from 201.05 million the previous year.
See Nua, How Many Online?, available at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how-many-online/world.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2002 This article concludes, revealing that conventional free speech jurisprudence, enunciated by the courts in the United States and India, cannot be sustained with the Internet. The Internet's sheer volume of information 4 necessitates that regulation occur through technological tools, 5 which are bound to have limitations. 6 Applying conventional tests using these imperfect tools could have a dreadful effect on freedom of speech. It is therefore critical that the judiciaries of the leading democracies recognize the potential dangers and protect freedom of speech on the Internet. If liberal standards are adopted for the Internet, there could be a uniform international standard for the freedom of speech.
PART I -THE INTERNET

A. History
The Internet is an outgrowth from a 1969 U.S. military program called ARPANET 7 . The next phase of development came in the 1970s when universities and research centers all over the United States were given access.' In the mid-1980s, the National Science Foundation took control of ARPANET and expanded its use to civilian networks. 9 In the last decade, the introduction 2002] of the World Wide Web dramatically changed public access to the Internet. 20 The Internet, as we know it today, has experienced extraordinary growth. 2 ' Government or state-owned institutions no longer control the Internet; multinational corporations now mainly control it. 2 India was a late entrant to the Internet revolution. In 1987, the first dialup e-mail network was set up. In 1995 commercial Internet access was finally introduced. 23 The rapid growth of the Internet is bound to cause numerous constitutional implications. Freedom of speech, right to privacy, right to information, and property rights are some key issues that are presently being debated. Other issues will undoubtedly arise as the Internet continues to expand. 26 This article focuses, however, on the issue of freedom of speech as it relates in particular to obscenity on the Internet in the United States and India.
B. Jurisdiction over the Internet
The Internet is multi-jurisdictional by nature. India's jurisprudence on jurisdictional aspects of the Internet is virtually non-existent. Due to the strong unitary model of government followed in India, interstate disputes never rise to the level of private international law. As a result, there has been little development of conflict of law rules in India. India's courts have had few opportunities to actually assume jurisdiction over foreign subjects. However, when these opportunities occur, India's courts follow universal conflict of law theories. 32 Now with recent passing of the Information Technology Act 2000 [hereinafter IT Act], India finally has a long-arm statute to assert its jurisdiction in court. 33 Jurisdiction with respect to freedom of speech concerns like who can claim the right and file a complaint differs between the United States and India. In the United States, freedom of speech is guaranteed to citizens, as well as foreigners; however, in India, freedom of speech is only offered to its citizens."
This distinction further complicates the already complex jurisdictional issues associated with the Internet. [Vol. 12:2 THE INTERNET Amendment. 3 8 Despite the similarities, however, the United States and India have developed distinct standards for freedom of expression.
B. United States
The right of free speech is not absolute in the United States. 39 The government may restrict speech in one of two ways.4 First, it may limit speech based on its content. Courts, however, subject all content-based regulations of speech to a strict scrutiny analysis, requiring that the regulation serve a compelling state interest through narrowly tailored means. 4 ' The second way the government may abridge speech is by enacting statutes that seek to regulate not the content of speech, but rather some effect of it. If a statute regulates speech in the streets, parks, or other public forum, it must serve a significant governmental interest through narrowly tailored means. 42 Obscenity is excluded from First Amendment protection. This stems from the fact that the framers of the First Amendment did not intend for all speech to be protected. 43 The Supreme Court recognized that certain types of speech, such as obscenity, are harmful to society and are therefore not protected by the First Amendment. 44 Even so, the Court continues to apply a strict scrutiny test to statutes abridging so-called "unprotected" speech. 45 The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of First Amendment protection for obscenity in Roth v. United States.' In Roth, the Court upheld the convictions of two defendants for violating California and federal obscenity statutes. 47 Roth was convicted under the federal obscenity statute for mailing obscene advertisements and books. 48 The majority opinion concluded 
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that obscene speech was not afforded protection by the First Amendment.
9
The Court emphasized that the First Amendment protects any speech that has even the smallest redeeming social value, unless it infringes upon other more important freedoms.
5
" The Court defined obscene material as that which "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."
5 ' The majority enunciated the following standard for determining whether material is obscene: "whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest., 52 The Court concluded that obscenity is widely regarded as lacking any social importance and thus is not entitled to First Amendment protection. 53 In 1973, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of obscenity. In Miller v. California, 54 the Court reviewed the defendant's conviction for using the mail to send unsolicited brochures depicting obscene matter in violation of California's obscenity statute." The majority announced a new three-part test for defining obscenity. 56 The first part asks "whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."" The second part asks "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."
5 " Finally, the third part asks "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
' 9 The Court determined that "contemporary community standards" should be used to determine obscenity and are "not 'national standards,"' which the Roth Court never intended to be used and which would prove unreasonable anyway. [Vol. 12:2 closing "adult" establishments under anti-obscenity laws, cities are concentrating efforts on regulating them through licensing and zoning.
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Currently the problem appears to be how to apply the "contemporary community standards" portion of the Miller test to the Internet. The Supreme Court faced similar challenges in the past when previous new media started to transmit indecent or otherwise impermissible material. 4 Ever changing technology forced the Court to consider not only the content of the speech, but also the means used to convey it. 65 In applying obscenity laws to media, courts tend to treat each one uniquely, including television, radio, books, newspapers, etc. 6 6 Because the various media approach and reach audiences differently, determining the constitutionality of applying obscenity laws has been anything but uniform.
Aside from its vagueness, applying the Miller test to the Internet poses many other problems. 67 First, it requires judges and juries to determine what the "community standards" are and to engage in literary criticism. Their nonexpertise, as well as the quantum of information that must be scrutinized, could overwhelm most judges and juries.
Second, the reference to "contemporary community standards" necessarily means local standards. The
Internet's very premise though is universal access, universal content, and a universal audience. [Vol. 12:2 the Indian Penal Code 78 for being in possession, for the purpose of sale, a copy of D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover. 7 The Court held that an immodest representation may not be reasonably restricted in the interest of "decency and morality" if it leads to the propagation of ideas or information of public interest. s° It stated that the test of obscenity is whether the publication, read as a whole, has a tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and therefore each work must be examined by itself."' With respect to art and obscenity, the Court held that "the art must be so preponderating as to throw obscenity into a shadow or the obscenity so trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and may be overlooked. ' 1 2 The Court concluded that the test to adopt in India, emphasizing community mores, is that obscenity without a preponderating social purpose or profit cannot have the constitutional protection of free speech. 3 India now faces the challenge to apply the Supreme Court's interpretation of the "reasonable restriction" test to the Interet. As previously mentioned, the Court emphasized that each work must be individually examined, applying community mores.8 The Internet, by its sheer volume, however, defies the application of this test.
Like the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, India's Constitution creates an absolute prohibition against limiting free speech without any exceptions. Exceptions, however, have evolved byjudicial decisions, although their scope is limited. 85 The fact that speech is presumptively constitutional in India, however, underscores the difficulty of reading into the "reasonable restriction" test, the limiting tests enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court. 6 Both U.S. and India's courts recognize the differences in the respective freedom of expression provisions. For example, Justice Douglas held that pre-censorship of cinema films is constitutionally void, stating that "if we had a provision in our Constitution for "reasonable" regulation of the press such as India has included in hers there would be room for argument that censorship in the interest of morality would be permissible." 88 78. Section 292 of the Indian Penal code was held constitutional, as it did not go beyond "obscenity," which fell directly within the words "public decency or morality" mentioned in Article 19(2 
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India's courts in the past have turned to U.S. First Amendment cases for guidance. 8 9 Nevertheless, the United States and India have adopted different tests to judge obscenity. The real difference, however, appears to be a question of degree, 90 which varies according to the moral standard of the community in question. 9' It would be fair to state though that the "reasonable restriction" test, as interpreted by India's Supreme Court, imposes greater restrictions on freedom of speech than the tests followed in the United States. 9 2 PART m -OBSCENITY ON THE INTERNET
A. Free Speech Jurisprudence and the Internet
The United States has a complex First Amendment jurisprudence that varies the protection offered free speech according to form. 93 Similarly, India developed its own free speech jurisprudence that applies a "reasonable restrictions" test based on eight listed restrictions. 94 These respective restrictions as applied to the Internet raise some important freedom of speech issues in both the United States and India. 9 '
B. United States
First Amendmentjurisprudence varies free speech rights according to the technological medium that is used for expression. 96 Historically, print media (newspapers and magazines) receives the greatest consideration and leniency by U.S. courts while broadcast media (television and radio) the least. 97 The difficulties in applying traditional free speech concepts to such a widely different medium has not discouraged the Congress in its efforts to regulate the Internet. Under the auspices of " [its] It prohibited and punished intentional transmission of obscene or indecent communication to recipients under the age of eighteen (the "indecent transmission" provision), 1 2 as well as intentional sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in any manner to the same (the "patently offensive" display provision).' 0 3 The Act immediately sparked controversy. On the very day President Clinton signed the bill into law, a group of plaintiffs, led by the American Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter ACLU], filed suit against the Attorney General and the Department of Justice challenging the constitutionality of the CDA.'°F ollowing the district court's grant of a temporary restraining order against its enforcement, several additional plaintiffs filed suits. The cases were consolidated and a three-judge panel convened, which unanimously granted a preliminary injunction against enforcing the CDA's provisions. 5 The It found that "'cyberspace' [is] located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet."" It held that the CDA had vagueness problems, which undermined its purpose,"' stating that it "suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."" 1 2
Reno's dissenting opinion agreed with the majority that the CDA placed too much of a burden on adult speech." 3 However, the dissent viewed the CDA as a form of "cyberzoning" akin to a time, place, and manner restriction, and not as a content-discriminatory ban. It concluded that the law was constitutional in part "as applied to a conversation involving only an adult and one or more minors, e.g., when an adult speaker sends an e-mail knowing the addressee is a minor." The government challenged the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which upheld the preliminary injunction.' 2 ' The Third Circuit held that COPA required every web publisher to abide by the most restrictive and conservative state community standards in order to avoid criminal liability, and that this constituted an impermissible burden on constitutionally protected speech.' 22 The Court noted, however, " [it] is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is harmful to them, even if it is not obscene by adult standards."' 23 Nevertheless, it affirmed the sentiments of the District Court, stating, "'sometimes we must make decisions which we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result."" By introducing such new standards as "patently offensive" and "harmful to minors," Congress continues its effort to regulate obscenity on the Internet. The CDA digressed some from the Miller test, yet still adopted the language "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards."' 2 Even so, the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down as unconstitutional.' 26 Congress then digressed further, adopting the retooled community standard enunciated in COPA. That standard has since been abandoned, however, act.. or contact... or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or female breast; and [that]... lacks... literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors." Id. § 231(e)(6).
Section (e)(7) defines minor as, "any person under 17 years of age." Id. § (e)(7). leaving U.S. courts to scrutinize Congress' newest standard, that of "harmful to minors." U.S. courts are also developing a new regulatory standard for Internet speech, one which is technology driven. 2 7 As "a new medium of mass communication," the Internet compels courts to consider its special qualities in determining the constitutionality of such regulation. 28 Dealing with the CDA and COPA, U.S. courts extensively discussed existing technology and their effectiveness in regulating the Internet." 9 The Supreme Court, for instance, supported its holding on the CDA by adopting the district court's finding that "existing technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults."''° This underscores the difficult technological aspect of regulating speech on the Internet and the significance it plays in the approaches continued to be taken by U.S. courts and legislative bodies.
C. India
Unlike the U.S. experience, which represents the difficulty in legislating free speech on the Internet, India's experience exhibits the contrary. In 1997, a website distributing a software package 3 ' was blocked by VSNL.' 36 The software permitted text customers to browse the net graphically. VSNL charged exorbitant rates for similar graphic service, standing to lose potentially substantial revenue because of this competition. 37 The government justified the illegal blocking of the website on the grounds that the software distributed did not comply with the provisions for text accounts, thus threatening the quality of Internet services to all users. 3 " India's courts, however, never tested this illegal blocking of a website 39 Through 1997 and 1998, VSNL continued their strong-arm tactics, including blocking websites'" and threatening action against subscribers. 4 ' Angered by these occurrences, Dr. Arun Mehta, a free speech activist, petitioned the Delhi High Court. 42 Dr. Mehta argued that "[blocking websites) is wholly without basis in law and amounts to arbitrary and illegal censorship of the petitioner's Fundamental Right to freedom of speech, expression and information as well as an illegal denial of his right to freedom to practice ISP The IT Act shares in creating an environment for electronic commerce.' 55 It serves as the fundamental mechanism for legalizing electronic transactions,' 5 6 but it also represents, however, an indirect attempt by India's government to impose restrictions on the freedom of speech and privacy on the Internet." 7 As it reflects the prevailing political culture, the IT Act embodies the view that the Internet is something that can and must be regulated before it gets out of control.
Section 67"' of the IT Act is designed to deter publication and transmission of obscene information in electronic form."
9 Just like the U.S. COPA equivalent, this section departs from the test enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court."° Under Section 67, "any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or... tend[s] to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely... to read, see or hear the matter.. . "is considered obscene.
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The section imposes dual punishment on offenders, including a fine and imprisonment up to a maximum term of ten years.
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Through the IT Act's passage, India's legislature ignored the "lewd, filthy and repulsive" and "preponderating social purpose" tests associated with earlier attempts at regulation. 16 3 Section 67 retains only the "tendency to deprave and corrupt" test.16 It introduces two new standards, "lascivious" and "appealing to prurient interest," 1 65 similar to COPA's introduction of new standards in the United States. These new standards even bear resemblance to COPA's provisions. 66 In addition, Section 67 appears to be as vague as COPA yet remains unchallenged, 167 73 Even so, this is inadequate to police the potential abuse of the sweeping powers given to officers under the Act. 74 As already discussed, India's courts have thus far been left out of the debate on the freedom of speech on the Internet. Consequently, India's regulators have had a seemingly free ride in their attempts to regulate the Internet. The apparent reasons for this could be summarized as follows: (1) The arbitrary blocking of websites (such as that of Shellshock and Dawn) lasted only temporarily and, therefore, eluded necessary testing by India's courts; (2) The blocking of Internet telephony sites did not constitute actionable harm for either the owners or their attempted users, as the majority non-Indian owners could not seek redress in India's courts, and standard VSNL user contracts explicitly prevented account users telephony and fax applications; (3) The IT Act's infancy necessarily means India's courts have not had an opportunity to scrutinize it; and (4) India's Civil liberties organizations are not well equipped to handle constitutional issues related to freedom of speech on the Internet. The most significant reason though for the apparent unchallenged acceptance of government restrictions on the Internet seems to be India's citizens' nonchalant attitude towards the operation of these restrictions. With conventional media, the means and degree of regulation are relevant, sensitive considerations. In the case of the Internet, however, regulations have passed almost unnoticed because of the historically high degree of freedom enjoyed with its use. The mentioned restrictions seem a bit hollow when compared to the widespread availability of the Internet. The reality is that the Internet allows its users to easily access information that in the past may have been unobtainable, or at the very least difficult to procure, without much thought about the transmission.
CONCLUSION
Differences in the right to free speech in the United States and India lie largely in the means used to protect this right and the degree of freedom enjoyed. In the United States, adopting a standard that adequately identifies obscene material has been anything but easy. Conventional media, as well as the Internet, have made this a difficult task, as each created problems for the three-part test for obscenity originally offered in Miller. India has struggled too, as the standard, "preponderating social purpose," laid down in Ranjit, has proven impractical when applied. The vagueness and uncertainty surrounding these attempted regulatory standards, coupled with the Intemet's inherent defiant attitude toward regulation, caused them to infringe upon adults' rights, while trying to protect children's interests. 5 Both legislatures, therefore, enacted new standards 7 6 for regulating obscenity on the Internet. These new standards aim to maintain the distinctions that have evolved with conventional media, while attempting to regulate the Internet more precisely. Even if they could overcome their vagueness problems, it seems improbable that such provisions could be implemented. 77 The Internet cannot relate to the current methods adopted by the United States and India that restrict freedom of speech. It can, however, temper the differences in these means, and in doing so, could act to equalize the means adopted to regulate freedom of speech.
As mentioned, the real difference in freedom of speech enjoyed in the United States and India is a question of degree. 7 This difference in degree is attributable to the reasonable restrictions provision' and the moral standard of the communities.' 8° India has progressed from an authoritarian system 8 ' of control and is now attempting a legislative model of control, quite similar to that of the United States, In India, the degree of freedom enjoyed on the Internet has far exceeded any similar freedom enjoyed with conventional media. The Internet provides access to all who wish to use the medium, and has created a relative parity among all users. 8 2 Moreover, the sheer volume of information made available by the Internet has substantially diluted the difference in the degree of freedom enjoyed in the United States and India.
The expanse and indefinable growth of the Internet' 83 suggests that technology will play a key role in any future attempt at its regulation." The difficulty lies in finding mechanisms that will selectively police content without infringing on the protected speech rights of its users. A group of hightech companies185 is currently joining forces to develop such a system to cope with indecent materials in Cyberspace.1 6 Its proposed effect on freedom of speech on the Internet can only be speculated at this time.' 87 Government lawmakers and judiciaries are also proceeding with newly adopted standards.' 88 It is imperative, however, that any and all attempts at regulating Internet speech be uniform globally to allow the Internet to retain its universal character. As the most participated form of mass speech out there, the Internet deserves the highest protection. 8 9 We have the opportunity with this duty to do something more, develop a uniform international standard for the freedom of speech.
